This paper shows that there is a direct connection between dialogues and belief sharing.This connection is shown by proving a correspondence between observational equivalence between dialogues and epistemic bisimulation between Hyper-Discourse Representation Structures(Hyper-DRS)constructed from dialogues.An observational equivalence between dialogues is defined by a kind of similarity of resulting shared beliefs of the dialogues.The theory of Hyper-DRSs is defined by extending Kamp's Discourse Representation Theory(Kamp and Reyle 1993),a formal semantics of discourse or a dynamic semantics,which is exploiting the theory of hypersets (Aczel 1987; Barwise and Moss 1996) in order to solve the problem of the definition, formation and revision of circular objects like shared beliefs.
If the semantics of dialogues in the above sense is related to the information which becomes public in the process of the dialogue,the notion of'public information'should be formalized in the semantics.Public information or shared belief is formalized as an infinite or circular object such that information p is public in the group C if and only if every member of C believes that p and that p is public in C,as (Lewis 1969; Clark and Marshall 1981; Barwise 1989) argued.Some scholars have already pointed out the connection between natural language use and shared beliefs or mutual beliefs(cf.Definite Reference (Clark and Marshall 1981) ,the Dirty Children Puzzle or.Conway's paradox (Barwise 1989; Fagin,Halpern,Moses,and Vardi 1995) ),but they mainly argue that shared belief is a part of presuppositions of dialogues.
However,the direct connection between each move of a dialogue and belief sharing has not yet been discussed.Our main claim in this paper is that the viewpoint of"dialogues as belief sharing"provides for a successful semantics of dialogues and that this viewpoint entails that information possessed by an agent becomes public in the group of conversants through the processes of dialogues.1 The notion of dialogues as belief sharing can be factored into three notions:(i)dialogues can be analyzed as shared belief formations/revisions,(ii)dialogues are compositional,and (iii)dialogues are processes whose identity is definable from the resulting shared beliefs.In section 2.1,2.2,and 2.3,we will discuss these points in detail.
Dialogues as Shared Belief Formations/Revisions
If the notion of"dialogues as belief sharing"is useful,we must explain the fact that a dialogue itself presupposes a shared belief about its language usage,since every instance of language use presupposes shared beliefs about the language and its use.We can reduce the shared belief about language usage to the problem of language acquisition or of an agent's social adaptation.However,can dialogues be considered as shared belief formations from square one,ignoring common knowledge about language use?Our answer is yes.For example,the information who is the other for each conversant2 and who/what is the speaker,namely,information about mutual identification in terms of (Stenstrom 1994) ,is deliberately shared at the opening or turn-exchange phase of a dialogue,as in(1).
( The Semantic Dependency of Moves on their Adjacent Moves The information content of a move is not completely determined by the move itself.It depends on the adjacent moves. (7)shows that Huh?must have a previous move. Although these examples only describe properties of Huh?,they do show the possibility of a semantic dependency of moves on their adjacent moves. Therefore, the semantics of moves or dialogues must treat their dependence on the context (i.e.,the state of the shared belief).
Well-definedness of Shared Beliefs and(Non-)Well-foundedness of Dialogues The notion of shared beliefs can be defined formally in many ways as in (Barwise 1989 )and(Fagin, Halpern,Moses,and Vardi 1995), but there is still the question of the relevance of such a formal definition of shared beliefs to the semantics of dialogues.One of the properties of dialogues,the finiteness of acknowledgements,requires the well-definedness of the notion of shared beliefs. Normal dialogues finish in finite moves.In particular,as in(9a),a reply is achieved by one or a few moves. However,if an acknowledgement move can only acknowledge the previous move,and every move must be acknowledged,then every acknowledgement also needs its own acknowledgement. This would lead to dialogues like(9b)that can't terminate in finite many moves.Even if an acknowledgement carries the information that the speaker shares the belief that was just expressed,that belief also needs to be shared and this leads right back to infinite dialogues.
If shared beliefs are formalized as in (Barwise 1989) and (Fagin,Halpern,Moses,and Vardi 1995) ,shared beliefs satisfy,at least,the Fixed Point Axiom(10a)and the Induction Rule (10b). The relation between dialogues and shared beliefs allows for a notion of equivalence of dialogues as processes based on identification of the shared beliefs that they give rise to.For example,in dialogues'Do you have the three of spades?A;Yes.B'and'I have the three of spades.B;Uh-huh.A',the same information'B believes that B has the three of spades'becomes public between agents A and B,even if B tells a lie and A knows that.We say that these two dialogues are observationally equivalent.This equivalence does not concern the private information which each of the conversants really has,but the public or observable(in the above sense)information between them.5 In this section,we will consider three classes of observationally equivalent dialogues6: Dialogues(ha-c)are observationally equivalent,since as the result of each dialogue A and B have shared the belief of their mutual identification.We define Max and Clare's mutual identification as the shared belief whose content is expressed by the following formulas:
, where Other(x)means that'x is the other who someone talks with,'Name(x)means that express that they have recognized each other.These propositions play the role of the basis (i.e.,the common ground)of what the indexicals'me(I)'and'you'mean.Therefore,the opening phases of dialogues form the basic shared belief.Conversely,this kind of shared belief is normally established in the opening phase of a dialogue.
Subdialogues on formed shared beliefs According to (Stenstrom 1994) ,follow-ups moves ratify the response moves just previously uttered by the other,and,in particular, in(12)Right serves as a confirmation of a mutual agreement.
(12)Shall we keep those brackets as they are?A;Yes.B;Right.A Re-opener moves can also be used to double-check an agreement,as Right?in(13). Thus,our problem here is how to formalize the information sharing in dialogues so as to reflect observational equivalence of the dialogues. More formally,given a set of atoms U,an equational system of sets E is defined as the triple(X,A,e),consisting of a set X C U,a set A disjoint from X,and a function We will adopt the Shared-Situation approach here,since it formalizes shared beliefs as finite objects,and the Fixed Point approach,which can similarly formalize them as finite objects,can be considered a distributed belief of the shared belief.Namely,the Fixed Point situation sF can be considered the solution to sF={(Bel,a,t;1),(Bel,a,t;1)}, and t={(H,a,3•Ÿ;1)} U sF,i.e.,t= {(H,a,3•Ÿ;1),(Bel,a,t;1), (Bel,a,t;1)1.Therefore, sF={(Bel,a,ss;1),(Bel,a,ss;1)}. This property grasps the essence of shared beliefs,which, in modal logic approaches (Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995) to shared beliefs or common knowledge, is axiomatized as the Fixed Point Axiom(10a)and the Induction Rule(lob).
3. The equational systems are adopted for the following reasons:
The intrinsic infinity or circularity of shared beliefs can be finitely represented by equational systems,e.g.,the shared belief of proposition p between agent A and B is repre- (to push a discourse referent to S or to pop the top of S).U means disjoint union.
The following Construction Rules are for typical conversational moves.
12 This is similar to Hintikka's semantics(cf. (Hintikka and Sandu 1997) )of questions, since it involves the other's epistemic operator.However,the difference from Hintikka's semantics is that the goal of the question is not the proof of the proposition with the other's epistemic operator,but sharing the proposition in our semantics. On the other hand,the standard formal semantics of questions is based on a possible world semantics by (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1997) to X=Bka(X)n Bkb(X).
Proof Let F be a function X•¨Bka(X)nBkb6 (X) for X C dom(k)n T. If F is monotone,
F has the greatest fixed point and the least fixed point by the since(pow(Xo),C)is a complete lattice.We only need to show that F is downward continu- states of the dialogue.This is not a belief sharing,but shows that the same proposition is distributed over agent a and b. 19 Ginsburg proposes a model of a dialogue participant DP which consists of two parts:an unpublicized mental situation and a gameboard configuration GB which consists of facts,question under discussion QUD,and the content of last move made.GB can be seen as the shared belief formed during a dialogue.However,GB has no circular structure,and no formalization of shared belief.Rather,these devices are made to account for the (topical)structures of dialogues.
20
The representation:Shared(x''',y'''},a,i):
x'''y'''
x'''is more massive than y''' is introduced in order to represent definite references between conversants,but no semantics for the representation is given. 21 As for Dynamic Semantics, Groeneveld's(1994) approach to circular propositions can be applied to the dynamic semantics of dialogues as belief sharing by extending his original language as follows: (1) is handled by the proposal of Hyper-DRSs of which semantics depends on Hyperset Theory which can formalize shared beliefs with finite means,although any shared belief is an intrinsically infinite object.Point(ii)is handled by the proposal of a Construction Algorithm,a Construction Rules of Hyper-DRSs and the design of Hyper-DRSs so as to be easy to update.
Point(iii)is handled by epistemic bisimulation of Hyper-DRSs which reflects observational equivalence of dialogues.
